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Saturday, November 27, 2010

DIPLOMATIC STEPS THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND THE IMPACT OF THE UNIFICATION BEFORE 1914.


The year 1850 – 1870 witnessed one of the most remarkable changes in European history. With the treaty of Utmutz further emphasising Austria’s supremacy in Germany, obviously dashing the hopes of nationalist idealists and even the Prussian monarchy for an highly anticipated united Germany, it appeared there was still a lot of waiting to exercised.

The arrangement resulting from Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 after the Napoleonic Wars endorsed Austrian dominance in Central Europe. However, the negotiators at Vienna took no account of Prussia's growing strength within and among the German states, failing to foresee that Prussia would challenge Austria for leadership within the German states. There became the German question which presented two solutions to the problem of unification: Germany solution (Germany without Austria), or greater Germany solution (Germany with Austria).

The first major steps or effort made at unifying German states was the widespread German revolution of 1848 – 1849 which stressed for or targeted unification and a single German constitution. The revolutionaries pressured various state governments, particularly strong in the Rhineland, for a parliamentary assembly which would have the responsibility to draft constitution.

As a follow up, in 1949 the Frankfurt Parliament offered the title of Emperor to the Prussian king, Frederick William IV. He refused for a variety of reasons. Publicly, he replied that he could not accept a crown without the consent of the actual states, by which he meant the princes. He feared the opposition of the other German princes and the military intervention of Austria and Russia. Therefore, it seemed the Frankfurt Parliament ended in partial failure. While the liberals did not achieve the unification they sought, they did manage to work through many constitutional issues and collaborative reforms with the German princes.

After the Frankfurt Parliament disbanded, Frederick William IV, under the influence of General Joseph Maria von Radowitz, supported the establishment of the Erfurt Union, a federation of German states, excluding Austria, by the free agreement of the German princes. This limited union under Prussia would have almost entirely eliminated the Austrian influence among the other German states. However, combined diplomatic pressure from Austria and from Russia (a guarantor of the Vienna 1815 agreements that established European spheres of influence) forced Prussia to abandon the idea of the Erfurt Union. This was more of a humiliation to the Prussians.
Although this event seemed minor, the Erfurt Union proposal brought the problems of influence in the German states into sharp focus. The question of unification became not a matter of if, but when; but more seriously for Prussia was that “when” was dependent upon strength.

It must be noted that the possibility of German unification challenged the fundamental principles of balance laid out in 1815 and guaranteed by four powers: Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria. Each power had its geographic sphere of influence; for France, this sphere included the Iberian peninsula and shared influence in the Italian states; for the Russians, the eastern regions of Central Europe, and balancing influence in the Balkans; for the Austrians, this sphere included much of the Central European territories of the old Reich (Holy Roman Empire); and for the British, the rest of the world, especially the seas which accounted for her dominance of the international trade and her naval strength.
As for the matter of the German unification depending on strength, Prussia had began to maximise her potentials in many important areas. By 1859, Wilhelm had become regent for his ailing brother Fredrick William IV. He made two very significant appointments. Albrecht Von Roon became minister of war and Helmuth Von Moltke was chief of the General Staff. These two ministers were strongly anti-liberal and anti-Austria and their two Immediate programme was to strengthen the Prussian army by increasing its number from 500,000 -750,000. For this purpose, they demanded from the Prussian parliament a considerable increase in taxation. This was to meet a brick-wall as a result of strong liberal opposition on the Prussian parliament until the appointment of Otto Von Bismarck as Minister-President, who resolved the crisis in favor of the war minister.

Bismarck showed no compromise with the liberals. His statement to the Prussian parliament which read “Germany has its eyes not on Prussian’s liberalism but on its might. The great question of the day will not be decided by speeches and resolution of majorities, but by blood and iron”. This statement seemed to have hit the liberals and Bismarck had had a major home victory which eventually lead to a smooth run for Bismarck in his foreign policy. This foreign policy which was firstly, to unite Germany under Prussian control. Uniting Germany meant firstly, to defeat Austria and expel her from German confederation. Furthermore, Bismarck wanted to make Germany the strongest state in Europe and this meant he would have to defeat France lead by Napoleon III as the latter was seriously a threat to this ambition.

The Crimean War of 1854–1855 and the Italian War of 1859 disrupted relations among Great Britain, France, Austria and Russia. In the upshot of this hysteria, the convergence of Von Moltke's operational redesign, Von Roon and Wilhelm's restructuring of the army, and Bismarck's diplomacy influenced the restructuring of the European balance of power. Their combined agenda established Prussia as the leading German power through a combination of foreign diplomatic triumphs, backed up by the possible use of Prussian military might and real politicking as engineered by Bismarck.

The first opportunity to achieving the Prussian foreign policy agenda came with the threat of Danish ambition which actually served as a curtain-raiser for Bismarck. On 18 November 1863, King Christian IX of Denmark signed the Danish November Constitution, and declared the Duchy of Schleswig a part of Denmark. The German Confederation saw this act as a violation of the London Protocol of 1852 which emphasized the status of the kingdom of Denmark as distinct from the independent duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Furthermore, the Schleswig and Holstein populations valued their separate status as well: a large portion of the duchy of Holstein was of German origin and spoke German in everyday life; the population was more mixed in Schleswig, with a sizable Danish minority. Diplomatic attempts to have the November Constitution repealed collapsed and fighting began when Prussian and Austrian troops crossed the border into Schleswig on 1 February 1864. Originally, the Danes attempted to defend their country using the Danewerk, an ancient earthen wall, but it proved indefensible. The Danes were no match for the combined Prussian and Austrian forces and could count on no help from their allies in the other Scandinavian states (Denmark had violated the Protocols). The Needle Gun, one of the first bolt action rifles to be used in conflict, aided the Prussians in both this war and the Austro-Prussian War two years later. The gun enabled a Prussian soldier to fire five shots while laying prone, while his muzzle-loading counterpart fired one shot and reloaded while standing. The Second Schleswig War resulted in victory for the combined armies of Prussia and Austria and the two countries won control of Schleswig and Holstein in the concluding peace settlement signed on 30 October 1864 in Vienna.

Even with Austria and Prussia fighting side by side to conquering the Danes, Bismarck was still very interesting in ousting the Austrians from the German confederation altogether. He was to use the Schleswig-Holstein question. Austria had been seeded administration of Holstein while Prussia Schleswig in the arrangement that followed the end of the Danish adventure. In 1866, in concert with the newly-formed Italy, Bismarck created a diplomatic environment in which Austria declared war on Prussia. He skillfully played upon the hatred between the new kingdom of Italy and Austria, who still held the territory of Venetia. He promised the Italians the territory of Venetia as a result of successful war against Austria. The Italians were to assist Bismarck if war is declared within three months of the agreement.

Also, Bismarck ensured that Russia and France would not involve the war. Prussia was actually in the good book of Czar Alexander of Russia at this time. The Poles had risen in revolt against Russia in an attempt to overthrow the Vienna settlement of 1815 and gain independence. This revolt was crushed by the Russian army and refugees attempted to cross to Prussia in great numbers. Bismarck had turned them back and several important leaders of this revolt were capture as a result. The Czar was therefore very grateful for Bismarck’s assistance. As for France, Bismarck hinted to Napoleon through the Prussian ambassador that he would be willing to consider concessions of territory to Napoleon along the Rhine.

The Austrians had supported the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg to rule Schleswig-Holstein and this was highly opposed by Prussia. Bismarck now accused the Austrians of stirring up trouble for Prussia in Schleswig and in June 1866, Prussian troop took over Holstein which led Austria to declaring war against Prussia. The Prussian armament was far more sophisticated. While the Austria used the old muzzle-loading rifles, Prussia had the new breech-loading needle gun.

Although several German states initially had sided with Austria, Prussian troops intercepted their soldiers and sent them home and Austria, with support only from Saxony, faced Prussia alone; although France promised support, it came late and was insufficient. Complicating the situation for Austria, the Italian mobilization on the border in the south required their army to fight the Third Italian War of Independence on a second front and on the Adriatic Sea. The day-long Battle of Königgrätz, near the village of Sadová, gave Prussia an uncontested and decisive victory.

Having successfully ousted Austria, It was then time to face France. With skillful manipulation of European affairs, Bismarck created a situation in which France played the role of aggressor in German affairs, and Prussia, that of protector of German rights and liberties.
In 1868, a revolution had occurred in Spain overthrown Queen Isabella II, and the throne had remained empty and in 1870 the Regency offered the crown to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a prince of the Catholic cadet Hohenzollern line. Bismarck encouraged Leopold to accept the offer, as a successful installment of a Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen king in Spain would mean that two countries on either side of France both had kings of German descent, which may have been a pleasing prospect for Bismarck, but was unacceptable to Napoleon III. It was this subject matter and ensuing events that led France to declaring war against Prussia.

Napoleon III of France developed a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy similar to that of his uncle, Napoleon Bonaparte. He hoped that Austria would join in a war of revenge, and that her former allies, particularly the south German states would join in the cause, but the 1866 treaty came into effect which allowed all German states unite militarily and France engaged in a war against the German states, supported by no one. By 1st of September 1870, the French emperor had been captured and France had been defeated. On 18 January 1871, the German princes and senior military commanders proclaimed Wilhelm "German Emperor" in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles.

The successful unification of German states into one federation placed her in pole position in the European affairs afterward. There were great improvements in the Industrial sector and her population increased tremendously. Infact, Germany became a major power in Europe which was now to put her forward as a participant in the scramble for oversea colonies and was later to enable her prosecute and sustain two world wars.

Monday, June 28, 2010

APPEASEMENT

Appeasement was the policy of European democracies in the 1930s that aimed to avoid war with the dictatorships of Germany and Italy. It has been described as "...the policy of settling international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly dangerous."It arose from the desire to avoid another war like the First World War.

The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain towards Nazi Germany between 1937 and 1939. His policies of avoiding war with Germany have been the subject of intense debate for seventy years among academics, politicians and diplomats. The historian's assessment of Chamberlain has ranged from condemnation for allowing Hitler to grow too strong, to the judgment that he had no alternative and acted in Britain's best interests. At the time, these concessions were widely seen as positive, and the Munich Pact among Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy prompted Chamberlain to announce that he had secured "peace for our time".

The word "appeasement" has been used as a synonym for weakness and even cowardice since the 1930s, and it is still used in that sense today as a justification for firm, often armed, action in international relations.


The aftermath of the First World War
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement emerged out of the weakness of the League of Nations and the failure of collective security. The League of Nations was set up in the aftermath of the First World War in the hope that international cooperation and collective resistance to aggression might prevent another war. Members of the League were entitled to the assistance of other members if they came under attack. The policy of collective security ran in parallel with measures to achieve international disarmament and where possible was to be based on economic sanctions against an aggressor. It appeared to be ineffectual when confronted by the aggression of dictators, notably Germany's occupation of the Rhineland, and Italian leader Benito Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia.

Main article: Remilitarization of the Rhineland
On March the 7th 1936, in a challenge to the Versailles Settlement, Hitler sent German troops into the demilitarised Rhineland. It was a gamble for Hitler and many of his advisers opposed it. German officers had orders to withdraw if they met French resistance, but there was none. France consulted Britain and lodged protests with the League. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin said that Britain lacked the forces to back its guarantees to France and that public opinion would not allow it. In Britain it was thought that the Germans were merely walking into "their own back yard". Hugh Dalton, a Labour Party MP who usually advocated stiff resistance to Germany, said that neither the British people nor Labour would support either military or economic sanctions. In the Council of the League, only the Soviet Union proposed sanctions against Germany. Hitler was invited to negotiate. He proposed a non-aggression pact with the Western powers. When asked for details he did not reply. Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland had persuaded him that the international community would not resist him and put Germany in a powerful strategic position.

Main articles: Abyssinia Crisis and Hoare–Laval Pact
Mussolini had imperial ambitions in Abyssinia. Italy was already in possession of neighbouring Eritrea and Somalia. In December 1934 there was a clash between Italian and Abyssinian troops at Walwal, near the border between British and Italian Somaliland, in which Italian troops took possession of the disputed territory and in which 150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians were killed. When Italy demanded apologies and compensation from Abyssinia, Abyssinia appealed to the League. The League persuaded both sides to seek a settlement under a friendship treaty they had signed in 1928, but Italy continued troop movements and Abyssinia appealed to the League again. In October 1935 Mussolini launched an attack on Abyssinia. The League declared Italy to be the aggressor and imposed sanctions, but coal and oil were not included; blocking these, it was thought, would provoke war. Albania, Austria and Hungary refused to apply sanctions; Germany and the United States were not in the League. Nevertheless, the Italian economy suffered.[4]
In April 1935 Italy had joined Britain and France in protesting against Germany's rearmament. France was anxious to placate Mussolini so as to keep him away from an alliance with Germany. Britain was less hostile to Germany, set the pace in imposing sanctions and moved a naval fleet into the Mediterranean. But in November 1935, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare and the French Prime Minister, Pierre Laval, had secret discussions in which they agreed to concede two-thirds of Abyssinia to Italy. However, following a press leak of the content of the discussions, a public outcry forced Hoare and Laval to resign. In May 1936, undeterred by sanctions, Italy captured Addis Ababa, the Abyssinian capital, and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel III the Emperor of Ethiopia. In July the League abandoned sanctions. This episode, in which sanctions were incomplete and appeared to be easily given up, seriously discredited the League.
[edit] The conduct of appeasement, 1937–39

British Prime Minister Chamberlain, landing at Heston aerodrome on 30 September 1938 after his meeting with Hitler at Munich. In his hand he holds the peace agreement between Britain and Germany.

In 1937 Stanley Baldwin resigned as Prime Minister and Neville Chamberlain took over. Chamberlain pursued a policy of appeasement and rearmament. Chamberlain's reputation for appeasement rests in large measure on his negotiations with Hitler over Czechoslovakia in 1938.

Main article: Anschluss
When the German and Austro-Hungarian empires were broken up in 1918, the victors vetoed the inclusion of Austria within a German state, but many German-speaking Austrians wished to join Germany in the realignment of Europe. The constitutions of both the Weimar Republic and the First Austrian Republic included the aim of unification, which was supported by democratic parties. However, the rise of Hitler dampened the enthusiasm of the Austrian government for such a plan. Hitler had promoted an all-German Reich from the beginning of his career and in Mein Kampf (1924) said that he would attempt a union with Austria by force if necessary. By early 1938, Hitler had consolidated his power in Germany and was ready to implement this long-held plan.

The Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg wished to pursue ties with Italy, but turned to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania (the Little Entente). To this Hitler took violent exception and in January 1938 the Austrian Nazis attempted a putsch. Hitler summoned Schusschnigg to Berchtesgarten in February and demanded, with the threat of military action, that he release imprisoned Austrian Nazis and allow them participate in the government. Schuschnigg complied and appointed Arthur Seyss-Inquart, a pro-Nazi lawyer, as interior minister. To forestall Hitler and to preserve Austria's independence, Schuschnigg scheduled a plebiscite on the issue for 13 March. Hitler demanded that the plebiscite be cancelled. The German ministry of propaganda issued press reports that riots had broken out in Austria and that large parts of the Austrian population were calling for German troops to restore order. On 11 March, Hitler sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg, demanding that he hand over all power to the Austrian National Socialists or face an invasion. The British Ambassador in Berlin registered a protest with the German Government against the use of coercion against Austria, but realizing that neither France nor the United Kingdom would support him, Schuschnigg resigned in favour of Seyss-Inquart, who appealed to German troops to restore order. On 12 March the 8th Army of the German Wehrmacht crossed the Austrian border. They met no resistance and were greeted by cheering Austrians. This invasion was the first major test of the Wehrmacht 's machinery. Austria became the province of Ostmark, with Seyss-Inquart as appointed governor. A plebiscite was held on 10 April and officially recorded a support of 99.73 percent of the voters.

Although the victorious Allies of World War I had prohibited the union of Austria and Germany, their reaction to the Anschluss was mild.[6] Even the strongest voices against annexation, particularly those of Fascist Italy, France and Britain the "Stresa Front") were not backed by force. In the House of Commons Chamberlain said that "The hard fact is that nothing could have arrested what has actually happened [in Austria] unless this country and other countries had been prepared to use force."The American reaction was similar. The international reaction to the events of 12 March 1938 led Hitler to conclude that he could use even more aggressive tactics in his plan to expand the Third Reich. The Anschluss paved the way for Munich in September 1938 because it indicated the likely non-response of Britain and France to future German aggression.

Main article: Munich Agreement
Under the Versailles Settlement, Czechoslovakia was created, including the Sudetenland, which had a majority German population. In April 1938, Sudeten Nazis, led by Konrad Henlein, agitated for autonomy. Chamberlain, faced with the danger of a German intervention, warned Hitler that Britain might intervene. Hitler ordered an attack on Czechoslovakia. Lord Runciman was sent by Chamberlain to mediate in Prague and persuaded the Czech government to grant the Sudeten virtual autonomy. Henlein broke off negotiations and Hitler railed against Prague.

In September, Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden to negotiate directly with Hitler, hoping to avoid war. Hitler now demanded that the Sudetenland should be absorbed into Germany, convincing Chamberlain that refusal meant war. Chamberlain, with France, told the Czech president that he must hand to Germany all territory with a German majority. Czechoslovakia would thus lose 800,000 citizens (who favoured Germany), much of its industry and its mountain defences in the west. In effect, the British and French pressed their ally to cede territory to a hostile neighbour to prevent annihilation.

Hitler then informed Chamberlain that Germany was about to occupy the Sudetenland and that the Czechoslovaks had to move out. The Czechoslovaks rejected the demand, as did the British and the French. Mussolini persuaded Hitler to put the dispute to a four-power conference. Czechoslovakia was not to be a party to these talks. On 29 September, Hitler, Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier (the French Prime Minister) and Mussolini met in Munich. They agreed that Germany would complete its occupation of the Sudetenland, but an international commission would consider other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was told that if it did not submit, it would stand alone. At Chamberlain's request Hitler signed a peace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. Chamberlain returned to Britain promising "peace for our time". The following March, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, divided among Germany, Hungary, Poland, and an independent Slovakia.

The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, September 1938 to March 1939
The failure of Munich precipitated a shift in policy and Chamberlain set in place preparations for war, including an expansion of civil defence. [4] In March 1939 Chamberlain assured the Poles that Britain would support them if their independence was threatened. In April, Hitler began to make demands on the free city of Danzig (now Gdansk). Britain's assurance to Poland became a formal treaty in August, but the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax urged the Poles to negotiate with Hitler and pressed them to give up Danzig.[9]On 1 September Hitler invaded Poland and on 3 September Britain declared war on Germany. In October, Chamberlain rejected Hitler's offer of peace.

Chamberlain's conduct of the war was not popular and on 9 May 1940 Winston Churchill became Prime Minister. In July, some politicians inside and outside the government were still willing to consider Hitler's peace offer, but Churchill would not. Chamberlain died on 9 November the same year. Churchill delivered a tribute to him in the in which he said, "Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged."
Changing attitudes to appeasement After the First World War
Chamberlain's policy was in some respects a continuation of what had gone before and was popular until the failure of the Munich Agreement to stop Hitler in Czechoslovakia. "Appeasement" had been a respectable term between 1919 and 1937 to signify the pursuit of peace. Many believed after the First World War that wars were started by mistake, in which case the League could prevent them, or that they were caused by large-scale armaments, in which case disarmament was the remedy, or that they were caused by national grievances, in which case the grievances should be redressed peacefully. Many thought that the Versailles Settlement had been unjust, that the German minorities were entitled to self-determination and that Germany was entitled to equality in armaments.

Most Conservative politicians were in favour of appeasement, though Churchill said their supporters were divided. The Labour Party opposed the Fascist dictators on principle but did not want war, so it also tended to support appeasement. As Chamberlain left for Munich the whole House of Commons cheered him noisily. Churchill was unusual in believing that Germany menaced freedom and democracy and should be resisted over Czechoslovakia. A week before Munich he warned, "The partition of Czechoslovakia under pressure from England and France amounts to the complete surrender of the Western Democracies to the Nazi threat of force. Such a collapse will bring peace or security neither to England nor to France."

Czechoslovakia did not concern most people until the middle of September 1938, when they began to object to a small democratic state being bullied. Nevertheless, the initial response of the British public to the Munich agreement was generally favourable. On 30 September, on his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his famous "peace for our time" speech to delighted crowds. He was invited by the royal family on to the balcony at Buckingham Palace before he had reported to Parliament. The agreement was supported by most of the press, only Reynold's News and the Daily Worker dissenting.

In parliament the Labour Party opposed the agreement. Some Conservatives abstained in the vote. The Conservative Duff Cooper, who had resigned from the government in protest against the agreement, was the only MP to advocate war.

The journalist Shiela Grant Duff's Penguin Special, Europe and the Czechs was published and distributed to every MP on the day that Chamberlain returned from Munich. Her book was a spirited defence of the Czech nation and a detailed criticism of British policy, confronting the need for war if necessary. It was influential and widely read. Although she argued against the policy of "peace at almost any price" she never actually used the word "appeasement" and did not take the personal tone that Guilty Men was to take two years later.

A few on the far-left said that that Chamberlain looked forward to a war between Germany and Russia. British Communists, following the Party line defined by Stalin, argued that appeasement had been a pro-fascist policy and that the British ruling class would have preferred fascism to socialism. The Communist MP Willie Gallacher said "that many prominent representatives of the Conservative Party, speaking for powerful landed and financial interests in the country, would welcome Hitler and the German Army if they believed that such was the only alternative to the establishment of Socialism in this country."This view has persisted on the far-left.

Once war broke out, appeasement was blamed for the failure to stop the dictators. The Labour MP Hugh Dalton identified the policy with wealthy people in the City of London, Conservatives and members of the peerage who were soft on Hitler.[18] The entry of Churchill as Prime Minister hardened opinion against appeasement and encouraged the search for those responsible. Three British journalists, Michael Foot, Frank Owen and Peter Howard, writing under the name of "Cato" in their book Guilty Men, called for the removal from office of fifteen public figures they held accountable, including Chamberlain and Baldwin. The book defined appeasement as the "deliberate surrender of small nations in the face of Hitler's blatant bullying." It was hastily written and has few claims to historical scholarship, but Guilty Men shaped subsequent thinking about appeasement and it is said that it contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election.

The change in the meaning of "appeasement" after Munich was summarised later by the historian David Dilks: "The word in its normal meaning connotes the pacific settlement of disputes; in the meaning usually applied to the period of Neville Chamberlain premiership, it has come to indicate something sinister, the granting from fear or cowardice of unwarranted concessions in order to buy temporary peace at someone else's expense."
After the Second World War: Historians
Churchill's book The Gathering Storm, published in 1948, made a similar judgment to Guilty Men, though in moderate tones and with some claim to scholarship. This book and Churchill's authority confirmed the orthodox view.

Historians have subsequently explained Chamberlain's policies in various ways. It could be said that he believed sincerely that the objectives of Hitler and Mussolini were limited and that the settlement of their grievances would protect the world from war; for safety, military and air power should be strengthened. Many have judged this belief to be fallacious, since the dictators' demands were not limited and appeasement gave them time to gain greater strength.

In 1961 this view of appeasement as avoidable error and cowardice was set on its head by A.J.P. Taylor in his book The Origins of the Second World War. Taylor argued that Hitler did not have a blueprint for war and was behaving much as any other German leader might have done. Appeasement was an active policy, and not a passive one; allowing Hitler to consolidate himself was a policy implemented by "men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the circumstances of their time". Taylor said that appeasement ought to be seen as a rational response to an unpredictable leader, appropriate to the time both diplomatically and politically.
His view has been shared by other historians, for example, Paul Kennedy, who says of the choices facing politicians at the time, "Each course brought its share of disadvantages: there was only a choice of evils. The crisis in the British global position by this time was such that it was, in the last resort, insoluble, in the sense that there was no good or proper solution." Martin Gilbert has expressed a similar view: "At bottom, the old appeasement was a mood of hope, Victorian in its optimism, Burkean in its belief that societies evolved from bad to good and that progress could only be for the better. The new appeasement was a mood of fear, Hobbesian in its insistence upon swallowing the bad in order to preserve some remnant of the good, pessimistic in its belief that Nazism was there to stay and, however horrible it might be, should be accepted as a way of life with which Britain ought to deal."

The arguments in Taylor's Origins of the Second World War (sometimes described as "revisionist") were rejected by many historians at the time and reviews of his book in Britain and the United States were generally critical. Nevertheless, he was praised for some of his insights. By showing that appeasement was a popular policy and that there was continuity in British foreign policy after 1933, he shattered the common view of the appeasers as a small, degenerate clique that had mysteriously hijacked the British government sometime in the 1930s and who had carried out their policies in the face of massive public resistance; and by portraying the leaders of the 1930s as real people attempting to deal with real problems, he made the first strides towards attempting to explain the actions of the appeasers rather than merely to condemn them.

In the early 1990s a new theory of appeasement, sometimes called "counter-revisionist", emerged as historians argued that appeasement was probably the only choice for the British government in the 1930s, but that it was poorly implemented, carried out too late and not enforced strongly enough to constrain Hitler. Appeasement was considered a viable policy, considering the strains that the British Empire faced in recuperating from World War I, and Chamberlain was said to have adopted a policy suitable to Britain's cultural and political needs. Frank McDonough is a leading proponent of this view of appeasement and describes his book Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War as a "post revisionist" study. Appeasement was a crisis management strategy seeking a peaceful settlement of Hitler's grievances. "Chamberlain's worst error," says McDonough, "was to believe that he could march Hitler on the yellow brick road to peace when in reality Hitler was marching very firmly on the road to war." He has criticised revisionist historians for concentrating on Chamberlain's motivations rather than how appeasement worked in practice – as a "usable policy" to deal with Hitler.
After the Second World War: Politicians
Statesmen in the post-war years have often referred to their opposition to appeasement as a justification for firm, sometimes armed, action in international relations.
U.S. President Harry S. Truman thus explained his decision to enter the Korean War in 1950, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden his confrontation of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956, U.S. President John F. Kennedy his "quarantine" of Cuba in 1962, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson his resistance to communism in Indochina in the 1960s, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan his air strike on Libya in 1986. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher invoked the example of Churchill during the Falklands War of 1982: "When the American Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, urged her to reach a compromise with the Argentines she rapped sharply on the table and told him, pointedly, 'that this was the table at which Neville Chamberlain sat in 1938 and spoke of the Czechs as a faraway people about whom we know so little'." The spectre of appeasement was raised in discussions of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair also cited Churchill's warnings about German rearmament to justify their action in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War. In May 2008, President Bush cautioned against "the false comfort of appeasement" when dealing with Iran and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali demands a confrontational policy at the European level to meet the threat of radical Islam, and compares policies of non-confrontation to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler.

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

OBAMA GHANA SPEECH, SATURDAY JULY 11, 2009.

Good morning. It is an honor for me to be in Accra, and to speak to the representatives of the people of Ghana. I am deeply grateful for the welcome that I've received, as are Michelle, Malia, and Sasha Obama. Ghana's history is rich, the ties between our two countries are strong, and I am proud that this is my first visit to sub-Saharan Africa as President of the United States.

I am speaking to you at the end of a long trip. I began in Russia, for a Summit between two great powers. I traveled to Italy, for a meeting of the world's leading economies. And I have come here, to Ghana, for a simple reason: the 21st century will be shaped by what happens not just in Rome or Moscow or Washington, but by what happens in Accra as well.

This is the simple truth of a time when the boundaries between people are overwhelmed by our connections. Your prosperity can expand America's. Your health and security can contribute to the world's. And the strength of your democracy can help advance human rights for people everywhere.

So I do not see the countries and peoples of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world - as partners with America on behalf of the future that we want for all our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual responsibility, and that is what I want to speak with you about today.

We must start from the simple premise that Africa's future is up to Africans.

I say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this part of the world. I have the blood of Africa within me, and my family's own story encompasses both the tragedies and triumphs of the larger African story.

My grandfather was a cook for the British in Kenya, and though he was a respected elder in his village, his employers called him "boy" for much of his life. He was on the periphery of Kenya's liberation struggles, but he was still imprisoned briefly during repressive times. In his life, colonialism wasn't simply the creation of unnatural borders or unfair terms of trade - it was something experienced personally, day after day, year after year.

My father grew up herding goats in a tiny village, an impossible distance away from the American universities where he would come to get an education. He came of age at an extraordinary moment of promise for Africa. The struggles of his own father's generation were giving birth to new nations, beginning right here in Ghana. Africans were educating and asserting themselves in new ways. History was on the move.

But despite the progress that has been made - and there has been considerable progress in parts of Africa - we also know that much of that promise has yet to be fulfilled. Countries like Kenya, which had a per capita economy larger than South Korea's when I was born, have been badly outpaced. Disease and conflict have ravaged parts of the African continent. In many places, the hope of my father's generation gave way to cynicism, even despair.

It is easy to point fingers, and to pin the blame for these problems on others. Yes, a colonial map that made little sense bred conflict, and the West has often approached Africa as a patron, rather than a partner. But the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants. In my father's life, it was partly tribalism and patronage in an independent Kenya that for a long stretch derailed his career, and we know that this kind of corruption is a daily fact of life for far too many.

Of course, we also know that is not the whole story. Here in Ghana, you show us a face of Africa that is too often overlooked by a world that sees only tragedy or the need for charity. The people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, with peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections. And with improved governance and an emerging civil society, Ghana's economy has shown impressive rates of growth.

This progress may lack the drama of the 20th century's liberation struggles, but make no mistake: it will ultimately be more significant. For just as it is important to emerge from the control of another nation, it is even more important to build one's own.

So I believe that this moment is just as promising for Ghana - and for Africa - as the moment when my father came of age and new nations were being born. This is a new moment of promise. Only this time, we have learned that it will not be giants like Nkrumah and Kenyatta who will determine Africa's future. Instead, it will be you - the men and women in Ghana's Parliament, and the people you represent. Above all, it will be the young people - brimming with talent and energy and hope - who can claim the future that so many in my father's generation never found.

To realize that promise, we must first recognize a fundamental truth that you have given life to in Ghana: development depends upon good governance. That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That is the change that can unlock Africa's potential. And that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans.

As for America and the West, our commitment must be measured by more than just the dollars we spend. I have pledged substantial increases in our foreign assistance, which is in Africa's interest and America's. But the true sign of success is not whether we are a source of aid that helps people scrape by - it is whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.

This mutual responsibility must be the foundation of our partnership. And today, I will focus on four areas that are critical to the future of Africa and the entire developing world: democracy; opportunity; health; and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

First, we must support strong and sustainable democratic governments.

As I said in Cairo, each nation gives life to democracy in its own way, and in line with its own traditions. But history offers a clear verdict: governments that respect the will of their own people are more prosperous, more stable, and more successful than governments that do not.

This is about more than holding elections - it's also about what happens between them. Repression takes many forms, and too many nations are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves, or police can be bought off by drug traffickers. No business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 percent off the top, or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. That is not democracy, that is tyranny, and now is the time for it to end.

In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success - strong parliaments and honest police forces; independent judges and journalists; a vibrant private sector and civil society. Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in peoples' lives.

Time and again, Ghanaians have chosen Constitutional rule over autocracy, and shown a democratic spirit that allows the energy of your people to break through. We see that in leaders who accept defeat graciously, and victors who resist calls to wield power against the opposition. We see that spirit in courageous journalists like Anas Aremeyaw Anas, who risked his life to report the truth. We see it in police like Patience Quaye, who helped prosecute the first human trafficker in Ghana. We see it in the young people who are speaking up against patronage, and participating in the political process.

Across Africa, we have seen countless examples of people taking control of their destiny, and making change from the bottom up. We saw it in Kenya, where civil society and business came together to help stop post-election violence. We saw it in South Africa, where over three quarters of the country voted in the recent election - the fourth since the end of Apartheid. We saw it in Zimbabwe, where the Election Support Network braved brutal repression to stand up for the principle that a person's vote is their sacred right.

Make no mistake: history is on the side of these brave Africans, and not with those who use coups or change Constitutions to stay in power. Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.

America will not seek to impose any system of government on any other nation - the essential truth of democracy is that each nation determines its own destiny. What we will do is increase assistance for responsible individuals and institutions, with a focus on supporting good governance - on parliaments, which check abuses of power and ensure that opposition voices are heard; on the rule of law, which ensures the equal administration of justice; on civic participation, so that young people get involved; and on concrete solutions to corruption like forensic accounting, automating services, strengthening hotlines, and protecting whistle-blowers to advance transparency and accountability.

As we provide this support, I have directed my Administration to give greater attention to corruption in our Human Rights report. People everywhere should have the right to start a business or get an education without paying a bribe. We have a responsibility to support those who act responsibly and to isolate those who don't, and that is exactly what America will do.

This leads directly to our second area of partnership - supporting development that provides opportunity for more people.

With better governance, I have no doubt that Africa holds the promise of a broader base for prosperity. The continent is rich in natural resources. And from cell phone entrepreneurs to small farmers, Africans have shown the capacity and commitment to create their own opportunities. But old habits must also be broken. Dependence on commodities - or on a single export - concentrates wealth in the hands of the few, and leaves people too vulnerable to downturns.

In Ghana, for instance, oil brings great opportunities, and you have been responsible in preparing for new revenue. But as so many Ghanaians know, oil cannot simply become the new cocoa. From South Korea to Singapore, history shows that countries thrive when they invest in their people and infrastructure; when they promote multiple export industries, develop a skilled workforce, and create space for small and medium-sized businesses that create jobs.

As Africans reach for this promise, America will be more responsible in extending our hand. By cutting costs that go to Western consultants and administration, we will put more resources in the hands of those who need it, while training people to do more for themselves. That is why our $3.5 billion food security initiative is focused on new methods and technologies for farmers - not simply sending American producers or goods to Africa. Aid is not an end in itself. The purpose of foreign assistance must be creating the conditions where it is no longer needed.

America can also do more to promote trade and investment. Wealthy nations must open our doors to goods and services from Africa in a meaningful way. And where there is good governance, we can broaden prosperity through public-private partnerships that invest in better roads and electricity; capacity-building that trains people to grow a business; and financial services that reach poor and rural areas. This is also in our own interest - for if people are lifted out of poverty and wealth is created in Africa, new markets will open for our own goods.

One area that holds out both undeniable peril and extraordinary promise is energy. Africa gives off less greenhouse gas than any other part of the world, but it is the most threatened by climate change. A warming planet will spread disease, shrink water resources, and deplete crops, creating conditions that produce more famine and conflict. All of us - particularly the developed world - have a responsibility to slow these trends - through mitigation, and by changing the way that we use energy. But we can also work with Africans to turn this crisis into opportunity.

Together, we can partner on behalf of our planet and prosperity, and help countries increase access to power while skipping the dirtier phase of development. Across Africa, there is bountiful wind and solar power; geothermal energy and bio-fuels. From the Rift Valley to the North African deserts; from the Western coast to South Africa's crops -Africa's boundless natural gifts can generate its own power, while exporting profitable, clean energy abroad.

These steps are about more than growth numbers on a balance sheet. They're about whether a young person with an education can get a job that supports a family; a farmer can transfer their goods to the market; or an entrepreneur with a good idea can start a business. It's about the dignity of work. It's about the opportunity that must exist for Africans in the 21st century.

Just as governance is vital to opportunity, it is also critical to the third area that I will talk about - strengthening public health.

In recent years, enormous progress has been made in parts of Africa. Far more people are living productively with HIV/AIDS, and getting the drugs they need. But too many still die from diseases that shouldn't kill them. When children are being killed because of a mosquito bite, and mothers are dying in childbirth, then we know that more progress must be made.

Yet because of incentives - often provided by donor nations - many African doctors and nurses understandably go overseas, or work for programs that focus on a single disease. This creates gaps in primary care and basic prevention. Meanwhile, individual Africans also have to make responsible choices that prevent the spread of disease, while promoting public health in their communities and countries.

Across Africa, we see examples of people tackling these problems. In Nigeria, an Interfaith effort of Christians and Muslims has set an example of cooperation to confront malaria. Here in Ghana and across Africa, we see innovative ideas for filling gaps in care - for instance, through E-Health initiatives that allow doctors in big cities to support those in small towns.

America will support these efforts through a comprehensive, global health strategy. Because in the 21st century, we are called to act by our conscience and our common interest. When a child dies of a preventable illness in Accra, that diminishes us everywhere. And when disease goes unchecked in any corner of the world, we know that it can spread across oceans and continents.

That is why my Administration has committed $63 billion to meet these challenges. Building on the strong efforts of President Bush, we will carry forward the fight against HIV/AIDS. We will pursue the goal of ending deaths from malaria and tuberculosis, and eradicating polio. We will fight neglected tropical disease. And we won't confront illnesses in isolation - we will invest in public health systems that promote wellness, and focus on the health of mothers and children.

As we partner on behalf of a healthier future, we must also stop the destruction that comes not from illness, but from human beings - and so the final area that I will address is conflict.

Now let me be clear: Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at war. But for far too many Africans, conflict is a part of life, as constant as the sun. There are wars over land and wars over resources. And it is still far too easy for those without conscience to manipulate whole communities into fighting among faiths and tribes.

These conflicts are a millstone around Africa's neck. We all have many identities - of tribe and ethnicity; of religion and nationality. But defining oneself in opposition to someone who belongs to a different tribe, or who worships a different prophet, has no place in the 21st century. Africa's diversity should be a source of strength, not a cause for division. We are all God's children. We all share common aspirations - to live in peace and security; to access education and opportunity; to love our families, our communities, and our faith. That is our common humanity.

That is why we must stand up to inhumanity in our midst. It is never justifiable to target innocents in the name of ideology. It is the death sentence of a society to force children to kill in wars. It is the ultimate mark of criminality and cowardice to condemn women to relentless and systematic rape. We must bear witness to the value of every child in Darfur and the dignity of every woman in Congo. No faith or culture should condone the outrages against them. All of us must strive for the peace and security necessary for progress.

Africans are standing up for this future. Here, too, Ghana is helping to point the way forward. Ghanaians should take pride in your contributions to peacekeeping from Congo to Liberia to Lebanon, and in your efforts to resist the scourge of the drug trade. We welcome the steps that are being taken by organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS to better resolve conflicts, keep the peace, and support those in need. And we encourage the vision of a strong, regional security architecture that can bring effective, transnational force to bear when needed.

America has a responsibility to advance this vision, not just with words, but with support that strengthens African capacity. When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems - they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response. That is why we stand ready to partner through diplomacy, technical assistance, and logistical support, and will stand behind efforts to hold war criminals accountable. And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa and the world.

In Moscow, I spoke of the need for an international system where the universal rights of human beings are respected, and violations of those rights are opposed. That must include a commitment to support those who resolve conflicts peacefully, to sanction and stop those who don't, and to help those who have suffered. But ultimately, it will be vibrant democracies like Botswana and Ghana which roll back the causes of conflict, and advance the frontiers of peace and prosperity.

As I said earlier, Africa's future is up to Africans.

The people of Africa are ready to claim that future. In my country, African-Americans - including so many recent immigrants - have thrived in every sector of society. We have done so despite a difficult past, and we have drawn strength from our African heritage. With strong institutions and a strong will, I know that Africans can live their dreams in Nairobi and Lagos; in Kigali and Kinshasa; in Harare and right here in Accra.

Fifty-two years ago, the eyes of the world were on Ghana. And a young preacher named Martin Luther King traveled here, to Accra, to watch the Union Jack come down and the Ghanaian flag go up. This was before the march on Washington or the success of the civil rights movement in my country. Dr. King was asked how he felt while watching the birth of a nation. And he said: "It renews my conviction in the ultimate triumph of justice."

Now, that triumph must be won once more, and it must be won by you. And I am particularly speaking to the young people. In places like Ghana, you make up over half of the population. Here is what you must know: the world will be what you make of it.

You have the power to hold your leaders accountable, and to build institutions that serve the people. You can serve in your communities, and harness your energy and education to create new wealth and build new connections to the world. You can conquer disease, end conflicts, and make change from the bottom up. You can do that. Yes you can. Because in this moment, history is on the move.

But these things can only be done if you take responsibility for your future. It won't be easy. It will take time and effort. There will be suffering and setbacks. But I can promise you this: America will be with you. As a partner. As a friend. Opportunity won't come from any other place, though - it must come from the decisions that you make, the things that you do, and the hope that you hold in your hearts.

Freedom is your inheritance. Now, it is your responsibility to build upon freedom's foundation. And if you do, we will look back years from now to places like Accra and say that this was the time when the promise was realized - this was the moment when prosperity was forged; pain was overcome; and a new era of progress began. This can be the time when we witness the triumph of justice once more. Thank you.

Monday, September 14, 2009

EARLY ITALIAN DIPLOMACY; DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

The origins of modern diplomacy within the international spectrum of politics, could often be traced back to the states of Northern Italy. This was during the early renaissance, where the first diplomatic embassies were established in the thirteenth century. The state of Milan played an incredible part in the establishment of permanent embassies within the city states of Northern Italy. Various diplomatic traditions were also conceived within Italy. The presentation of an Ambassador's credentials and acknowledgments are elements that were inaugurated in Italian early modern diplomacy.

The practice of diplomacy and its various intricacies were also spread to various other autonomous European states. Milan created the first diplomatic international gesture in 1455, by sending a representative to the court of France. It was extremely controversial however, that they would not accept the same gesture from France, due to the fears of espionage and intervention in internal affairs. It had eventually become evidnt that as super powers such as France and Spain grew in size and strength, and there was an overarching necessity to accept any form of diplomatic effort within the international arena. Eventually Italy paved the way for all European power to exchange representatives. By the late 16th century, permanent emissaries were standard practice.

Real world diplomatic negotiations are very different from intellectual debates in a university where an issue is decided on the merit of the arguments and negotiators make a deal by splitting the difference. Though diplomatic agreements can sometimes be reached among liberal democratic nations by appealing to higher principles, most real world diplomacy has traditionally been heavily influenced by hard power.

The interaction of strength and diplomacy can be illustrated by a comparison to labor negotiations. If a labor union is not willing to strike, then the union is not going anywhere because management has absolutely no incentive to agree to union demands. On the other hand, if management is not willing to take a strike, then the company will be walked all over by the labor union, and management will be forced to agree to any demand the union makes. The same concept applies to diplomatic negotiations.

There are also incentives in diplomacy to act reasonably, especially if the support of other actors is needed. The gain from winning one negotiation can be much less than the increased hostility from other parts. This is also called soft power.

Many situations in modern diplomacy are also rules based. When for instance two WTO countries have trade disputes, it is in the interest of both to limit the spill over damage to other areas by following some agreed-upon rules.

The sanctity of diplomats has long been observed. This sanctity has come to be known as diplomatic immunity. While there have been a number of cases where diplomats have been killed, this is normally viewed as a great breach of honour. Genghis Khan and the Mongols were well known for strongly insisting on the rights of diplomats, and they would often wreak horrific vengeance against any state that violated these rights.

Diplomatic rights were established in the mid-seventeenth century in Europe and have spread throughout the world. These rights were formalized by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which protects diplomats from being persecuted or prosecuted while on a diplomatic mission. If a diplomat does commit a serious crime while in a host country he may be declared as persona non grata (unwanted person). Such diplomats are then often tried for the crime in their homeland.

Diplomatic communications are also viewed as sacrosanct, and diplomats have long been allowed to carry documents across borders without being searched. The mechanism for this is the so-called "diplomatic bag" (or, in some countries, the "diplomatic pouch"). While radio and digital communication have become more standard for embassies, diplomatic pouches are still quite common and some countries, including the United States, declare entire shipping containers as diplomatic pouches to bring sensitive material (often building supplies) into a country.

In times of hostility, diplomats are often withdrawn for reasons of personal safety, as well as in some cases when the host country is friendly but there is a perceived threat from internal dissidents. Ambassadors and other diplomats are sometimes recalled temporarily by their home countries as a way to express displeasure with the host country. In both cases, lower-level employees still remain to actually do the business of diplomacy.

ASIAN ORIGIN OF DIPLOMACY

Ancient India, with its kingdoms and dynasties, had a long tradition of diplomacy. The oldest treatise on statecraft and diplomacy, Arthashastra, is attributed to Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), who was the principal adviser to Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of the Maurya dynasty who ruled in the 3rd century BC, (whose capital was Patliputra, today's Patna, the chief city of Bihar state). Arthashastra is a complete work on the art of kingship, with long chapters on taxation and on the raising and maintenance of armies. It also incorporates a theory of diplomacy, of how in a situation of mutually contesting kingdoms, the wise king build alliances and tries to checkmate his adversaries. The envoys sent at the time to the courts of other kingdoms tended to reside for extended periods of time, and Arthashastra contains advice on the deportment of the envoy, including the trenchant suggestion that 'he should sleep alone'. The highest morality for the king is that his kingdom should prosper.
China

One of the earliest realists in international relations theory was the 6th century BC military strategist Sun Tzu (d. 496 BC), author of The Art of War. He lived during a time in which rival states were starting to pay less attention to traditional respects of tutelage to the Zhou Dynasty (c. 1050–256 BC) figurehead monarchs while each vied for power and total conquest. However, a great deal of diplomacy in establishing allies, bartering land, and signing peace treaties was necessary for each warring state.

From the Battle of Baideng (200 BC) to the Battle of Mayi (133 BC), the Han Dynasty was forced to uphold a marriage alliance and pay an exorbitant amount of tribute (in silk, cloth, grain, and other foodstuffs) to the powerful northern nomadic Xiongnu that had been consolidated by Modu Shanyu. After the Xiongnu sent word to Emperor Wen of Han (r. 180–157) that they controlled areas stretching from Manchuria to the Tarim Basin oasis city-states, a treaty was drafted in 162 BC proclaiming that everything north of the Great Wall belong to nomads' lands, while everything south of it would be reserved for Han Chinese. The treaty was renewed no less than nine times, but did not restrain some Xiongnu tuqi from raiding Han borders. That was until the far-flung campaigns of Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141–87 BC) which shattered the unity of the Xiongnu and allowed Han to conquer the Western Regions; under Wu, in 104 BC the Han armies ventured as far Fergana in Central Asia to battle the Yuezhi who had conquered Hellenistic Greek areas.

The Koreans and Japanese during the Chinese Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD) looked to the Chinese capital of Chang'an as the hub of civilization and emulated its central bureaucracy as the model of governance. The Japanese sent frequent embassies to China in this period, although they halted these trips in 894 during the Tang's imminent collapse. After the devastating An Shi Rebellion from 755 to 763, the Tang Dynasty was in no position to reconquer Central Asia and the Tarim Basin. After several conflicts with the Tibetan Empire spanning several different decades, the Tang finally made a truce and signed a peace treaty with them in 841.

In the 11th century during the Song Dynasty (960–1279), there were cunning ambassadors such as Shen Kuo and Su Song who achieved diplomatic success with the Liao Dynasty, the often hostile Khitan neighbor to the north. Both diplomats secured the rightful borders of the Song Dynasty through knowledge of cartography and dredging up old court archives. There was also a triad of warfare and diplomacy between these two states and the Tangut Western Xia Dynasty to the northwest of Song China (centered in modern-day Shaanxi). After warring with the Lý Dynasty of Vietnam from 1075 to 1077, Song and Lý made a peace agreement in 1082 to exchange the respective lands they had captured from each other during the war.

Long before the Tang and Song dynasties, the Chinese had sent envoys into Central Asia, India, and Persia starting with Zhang Qian in the 2nd century BC. Another notable event in Chinese diplomacy was the Chinese embassy mission of Zhou Daguan to the Khmer Empire of Cambodia in the 13th century. Chinese diplomacy was a necessity in the distinctive period of Chinese exploration. Since the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD), the Chinese also became heavily invested in sending diplomatic envoys abroad on maritime missions into the Indian Ocean, to India, Persia, Arabia, East Africa, and Egypt. Chinese maritime activity was increased dramatically during the commercialized period of the Song Dynasty, with new nautical technologies, many more private ship owners, and an increasing amount of economic investors in overseas ventures.

During the Mongol Empire (1206–1294) the Mongols created something similar to today's diplomatic passport called paiza. The paiza were in three different types (golden, silver, and copper) depending on the envoy's level of importance. With the paiza, there came authority that the envoy can ask for food, transport, place to stay from any city, village, or clan within the empire with no difficulties.

Since the 17th century, there was a series of treaties upheld by Qing Dynasty China and Czarist Russia, beginning with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in the year 1689. This was followed up by the Aigun Treaty and the Convention of Peking in the mid 19th century.
As European power spread around the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries so too did its diplomatic model and system become adopted by Asian countries.

EUROPEAN ORIGIN OF DIPLOMACY

The ability to practice diplomacy is one of the defining elements of a state. As noted above, diplomacy has been practiced since the first city-states were formed millennia ago in ancient Greece. For most of human history diplomats were sent only for specific negotiations, and would return immediately after their mission concluded. Diplomats were usually relatives of the ruling family or of very high rank in order to give them legitimacy when they sought to negotiate with the other state.

One notable exception involved the relationship between the Pope and the Byzantine Emperor; papal agents, called apocrisiarii, were permanently resident in Constantinople. After the 8th century, however, conflicts between the Pope and Emperor (such as the Iconoclastic controversy) led to the breaking of close ties.
The origins of diplomacy lie in the strategic and competitive exchange of impressive gifts, which may be traced to the Bronze Age and recognized as an aspect of Homeric guest-friendship.[3] Thus diplomacy and trade have been inexorably linked from the outset. "In the framework of diplomatic relations it was customary for Byzantine emperors and Muslim rulers, especially the 'Abbāsids and the Fātimids, as well as for Muslim rulers between themselves, to exchange precious gifts, with which they attempted to impress or surpass their counterparts," remarks David Jacoby, in the context of the economics of silk in cultural exchange among Byzantium, Islam and the Latin West:[4] merchants accompanied emissaries, who often traveled on commercial ships. At a later date, it will be recalled that the English adventurer and trader Anthony Sherley convinced the Persian ruler to send the first Persian embassy to Europe (1599–1602).

Early modern diplomacy's origins[5] are often traced to the states of Northern Italy in the early Renaissance, with the first embassies being established in the thirteenth century. Milan played a leading role, especially under Francesco Sforza who established permanent embassies to the other city states of Northern Italy. Tuscany and Venice were also flourishing centres of diplomacy from the 1300s onwards. It was in the Italian Peninsula that many of the traditions of modern diplomacy began, such as the presentation of an ambassador's credentials to the head of state.
From Italy the practice was spread to other European regions. Milan was the first to send a representative to the court of France in 1455. However, Milan refused to host French representatives fearing espionage and that the French representatives would intervene in its internal affairs. As foreign powers such as France and Spain became increasingly involved in Italian politics the need to accept emissaries was recognized. Soon the major European powers were exchanging representatives. Spain was the first to send a permanent representative; it appointed an ambassador to the Court of England in 1487. By the late 16th century, permanent missions became customary. The Holy Roman Emperor, however, did not regularly send permanent legates, as they could not represent the interests of all the German princes (who were in theory all subordinate to the Emperor, but in practice each independent).
During that period the rules of modern diplomacy were further developed. The top rank of representatives was an ambassador. At that time an ambassador was a nobleman, the rank of the noble assigned varying with the prestige of the country he was delegated to. Strict standards developed for ambassadors, requiring they have large residences, host lavish parties, and play an important role in the court life of their host nation. In Rome, the most prized posting for a Catholic ambassador, the French and Spanish representatives would have a retinue of up to a hundred. Even in smaller posts, ambassadors were very expensive. Smaller states would send and receive envoys, who were a rung below ambassador. Somewhere between the two was the position of minister plenipotentiary.

Diplomacy was a complex affair, even more so than now. The ambassadors from each state were ranked by complex levels of precedence that were much disputed. States were normally ranked by the title of the sovereign; for Catholic nations the emissary from the Vatican was paramount, then those from the kingdoms, then those from duchies and principalities. Representatives from republics were ranked the lowest (which often angred the leaders of the numerous German, Scandinavian and Italian republics). Determining precedence between two kingdoms depended on a number of factors that often fluctuated, leading to near-constant squabbling.


French diplomat Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord is considered one of the most skilled diplomats of all time.
Ambassadors, nobles with little foreign experience and no expectation of a career in diplomacy, needed to be supported by large embassy staff. These professionals would be sent on longer assignments and would be far more knowledgeable than the higher-ranking officials about the host country. Embassy staff would include a wide range of employees, including some dedicated to espionage. The need for skilled individuals to staff embassies was met by the graduates of universities, and this led to a great increase in the study of international law, modern languages, and history at universities throughout Europe.

At the same time, permanent foreign ministries began to be established in almost all European states to coordinate embassies and their staffs. These ministries were still far from their modern form, and many of them had extraneous internal responsibilities. Britain had two departments with frequently overlapping powers until 1782. They were also far smaller than they are currently. France, which boasted the largest foreign affairs department, had only some 70 full-time employees in the 1780s.

The elements of modern diplomacy slowly spread to Eastern Europe and Russia, arriving by the early eighteenth century. The entire edifice would be greatly disrupted by the French Revolution and the subsequent years of warfare. The revolution would see commoners take over the diplomacy of the French state, and of those conquered by revolutionary armies. Ranks of precedence were abolished. Napoleon also refused to acknowledge diplomatic immunity, imprisoning several British diplomats accused of scheming against France.

After the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 established an international system of diplomatic rank. Disputes on precedence among nations (and therefore the appropriate diplomatic ranks used) persisted for over a century until after World War II, when the rank of ambassador became the norm. In between that time, figures such as the German Chancellor Otto von Bismark were renowned for international diplomacy.

Thursday, August 6, 2009

A SUMMARY OF CHAPTER TWO OF WALTER RODNEY’S HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA

The African continent over decades had been portrayed in bad light by many European historians and scholars. The continent has been described as one with a primitive history and therefore not worthy of any historical reconstruction. But this assertion is far from being true as these European writers are not even justified to write any bit of African history in the first place, as they have very minimum or little knowledge of African history. Infact, most of these works were based on hearsay and mere assertion and therefore were misleading.

In the recent years, Africans and foreigners whom are well grounded in history have come to discover this misleading thought about African history and have made considerable effort to proving to the world that Africa had developed an organized society, where a lot of developmental activities took place for many centuries.

Chapter two title “How Africa Developed before the coming of the European Up To the 5th Century” of the book “How Europe Under Developed Africa” by Walter Rodney, is a careful analysis and explanation of various civilizations that emerged in Africa which even drew attention of the outside world (Europe and Arabia) due to great works that Africans had put in place at that time, before the coming of the Europeans, in order to correct the derogatory and barbaric picture that had being painted of Africa.

It is pertinent to mention that Europe in the period under study is not justified to tag Africa under-developed nor African assume same of Europe. Each continent had their unique environmental and social factors that contributed or affected the various forms of development that occurred therein. A section of the said chapter better explains this assertion as follows:

Europeans and Africans themselves in the colonial period lacked due regard for the unique features of African culture. These features have a value of their own that cannot be eclipsed by European culture either in the comparable period before 1500 or n the subsequent centuries. They cannot be eclipsed because they are not really comparable phenomena. Who in this world is competent to judge weather an Austrian Waltz is better than a Makonde Ngoma? …….page 38

It is obvious that some of the world’s development and civilization of today which Europe claim to be her handiwork actually started in Africa but was later improved upon my Europe after Africa had suffered greatly from the periods of slave trade and colonialism, which drew the continent backward.

The art of Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Benin were well known to the rest of the world at an early date and this artistic prowess brought many traders and visitors to these areas of Africa where these materials of art were bought and taken to Europe and Asia. The quality of products that were made by Africans shows the level of economic development, which was comparable or in some cases more sophisticated than that prevalent in Europe. The red leather (Moroccan leather) that became familiar to Europe was produced by the Hausa and Mandinga manufacturers in Nigeria and Mali and this leather was superior to that obtainable in Europe and also preferable by Europeans. Also, the Portuguese who on reaching the Kongo Kingdom, were amazed to see high quality local cloths made from bark and palm, fibre, which could be comparable to velvet. Other finished products from raw materials were also prevalent in other parts of African which Europeans patronized.

One may ask, why did this not lead to a massive growth in the African industry? The answer to this question is not far fetch. At the period under study, Africa’s manufacturing industry was still on a subsistent-like or domestic level. It must be noted that a decisive factor in the growth of the European industry is the available new machinery and change-over from domestic production to the factory system and all these advances in Europe came after the period under review when Africa was already suffering from the slave trade and thereafter colonialism which cause massive brain drain.

Furthermore, there was the presence of high and organized state system in Africa as was evidenced in Egypt, Ethiopia, Nubia, Maghreb, Benin, Yoruba, etc. Though the Ibo people of Nigeria and the Kikuyu people of Kenya operated systems that some European writers had referred to as stateless, that cannot be entirely justified because both had sophisticated systems of political rule.

“It was in Europe that the nation state reached an advanced stage, and Europe tended to use the presence or absence of well-organized polities as a measure of civilization. That is not entirely justified, because in Africa there were small political units which had relatively advanced material and non-material cultures. For instance, neither the Ibo people o f Nigeria, nor the Kikuyu of Kenya ever produced large centralized governments in their traditional setting. But both had sophisticated systems of political rule based on clans and religious oracles and secret societies”…………..page 54.


In Zimbabwe, some of the greatest forms of civilization and development took place. Apart from evidence of the presence of a sophisticated political system, there is also one of the greatest constructions of bricks, the Walls of Zimbabwe, which is believed to have been made as far back as the 14th century. The said Wall which is 30 feet high and 20 feet thick has continued to catch the eye of foreigners since its discovery. There was attempted by some European writers and archaeologist, whom having seen the great works, decided to divert credit to Europe, but later discoveries shows that the wall and all other great works discovered in Zimbabwe were the handwork of Africans. This also goes to show the level of development that was already prevailing amid a people.

‘when Cecil Rhodes sent in his agents to rob and steal in Zimbabwe, they and other Europeans marveled at the surviving ruins of Zimbabwe culture, and automatically assumed that it had been build by white people’ …… page 78

Conclusively, Walter Rodney in this chapter of his book, tend to prove that after a discreet survey of the developed parts of Africa and the those in Europe in the 15th century, African could not be said to be underdeveloped nor was the prevalent factors that could be used to determining ‘the developed’ and ‘ the undeveloped’ in Africa’s discredit.

In carrying out this work, high level of tolerance, objectivity and fairness were brought to play, in order to ascertaining the actual position of things. It must be said that with varying examples and evidences from the chapter two of the book ‘How Europe underdeveloped Africa”, it as been proved beyond reasonable doubt that Africa evolved her own form of political, social and economic civilization and was in deed developed before the coming of the Europeans up to the 15th century.